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MODEL FREE EXERCISE CHALLENGES FOR
RELIGIOUS LANDMARKS
To preserve cultural history andfoster civic pride, states confer landmark status
on buildings of historic or architectural signpicance. For owners of such property,
landmark designation may prove more a burden than a blessing. Compelled to
maintain the building and restrainedfrom enlarging it, the owner may suffer spatial
andflnancial straim Challenges to landmark designations typically are brought on
due process and eminent domain grounds. If the landmark building is a church,
however, the burden of landmark designation raisesfrst amendment concerns. This
Note examines the conflict between a congregation's right to free exercise of religion
and the state's interest in historicpreservation. It applies the constitutional standard
for infringement offree exercise to four hypotheticalfactpatterns, suggests alterna-
tives to peremptory landmark designation, and concludes that the first amendment
provides a viable means of challenging burdensome landmark status.
INTRODUCTION
WHEN A LOCAL PLANNING commission confers landmark
status on a structure used for religious purposes and that
designation burdens the religious organization, the competing in-
terests of church and state must be reconciled. On the one hand,
the first amendment mandates vigilant protection of a congrega-
tion's right to free exercise of religion.' On the other, the state's
use of its police power to promote the health, safety, and welfare
of the community is well established and zealously guarded.2
Religious liberty has occupied a preferred position throughout
our nation's history? At times the Supreme Court has given it
even greater protection than that afforded freedom of press or
speech.4 Courts and legislatures have also begun to protect his-
1. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law... prohibit-
ing the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). The police
power concept was first introduced into United States constitutional law by Chief Justice
Taney in Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 578 (1847). Note, Land Use
Controls in Historic Areas, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 379, 382 (1969).
3. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); see also Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (referring to the preferred position of freedom of religion in a
conflict between property rights and religious liberty).
4. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONsTTrrUTION 19 (1964). Compare Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (prohibiting restriction on door-to-door distribution
of religious tracts) and Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (prohibiting restriction on
distribution of religious pamphlets on city streets), with Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding restriction on door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscrip-
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toric or .architecturally significant structures out of recognition
that too much of our cultural history has vanished in recent
years.5
In the past, litigation involving church6 property typically oc-
curred when a city attempted to exclude churches from residential
neighborhoods through the use of facially valid zoning ordi-
nances.7 Because of stronger historic preservation laws,8 courts
now face situations in which municipalities try to maintain ex-
isting buildings by giving them landmark status.9 Such status may
burden a church with severe financial and spatial problems.
While challenges in this area are typically brought on due process
and eminent domain grounds,10 first amendment challenges are
also made. When faced with a conflict between the right to free
exercise of religion and a facially valid landmark statute, how
should courts respond?
tions) and Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding restriction on distribu-
tion of commercial leaflets on city streets).
5. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1978). "Over
one-half of the buildings listed in the Historic American Buildings Survey, begun by the
Federal Government in 1933, have been destroyed." Id. at 108 n.2.
6. Throughout this Note, the word "church" is used generically to refer to religious
bodies and buildings of any and all faiths. When "landmark" is used as a verb in this
Note, it refers to the process of landmark designation.
7. See Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Har-
bor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d 534, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1975) (ordinance unconstitutional
as applied because it denied special use permit for location of religious institutions in resi-
dential district without setting reasonable requirements), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976);
American Friends of Soc'y of St. Pius v. Schwab, 68 A.D.2d 646, 417 N.Y.S.2d 991 (local
zoning authority must fashion such reasonable conditions as would allow church building
and minimize adverse effects on community), appealdenied, 48 N.Y.2d 611 (1979); Congre-
gation Comm., N. Fort Worth Congreg., Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d
700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (refusal to grant special exception to church was arbitrary and
unreasonable absent showing that such refusal was for promotion of public welfare, safety,
or morals).
8. Within the past 50 years, all states and over 500 municipalities have enacted his-
toric preservation statutes. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107.
9. See Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Board of Adjustment, 599 S.W.2d 61 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980) (church failed to prove inability to sell, lease, or economically utilize prop-
erty; demolition permit denied); Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415
N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980) (landmark status did not physically or financially
prevent or seriously interfere with charitable organization's purpose; demolition permit de-
nied); Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) (charitable organization unable to take advantage of landmark law's
compensation provisions; landmark designation violated organization's fifth and 14th
amendment rights); First Presbyterian Church v. City Council, 25 Pa. Commw. 154, 360
A.2d 257 (1976) (church failed to show inability to reap reasonable return from property,
demolition permit denied).
10. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
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This Note proposes to answer that question by examining
landmark laws in general"' and the test developed by the Supreme
Court for infringement of free exercise. 2 The Note then applies
this test to several hypothetical fact patterns,' 3 and concludes that
the first amendment provides a congregation with a viable means
of challenging a burdensome landmark designation.
I. LANDMARK LAW
The general validity of landmark law is well established. Al-
though there are federal and state statutes governing landmarks,
municipal landmark ordinances have the greatest effect. Since
these ordinances often regulate private property, they have been
attacked on both due process and eminent domain grounds.
A. General Validity and Operation
Landmark legislation is a form of zoning,' 4 and is thus within
the state's police power 5 to protect the health, safety, welfare, and
morals of the community.'6 The breadth of police power protec-
tion has expanded to include spiritual and aesthetic matters.17
Since the objectives enumerated in a state's enabling act are gen-
erally narrower than those embraced by the police power,"8
problems with the facial validity of a zoning regulation or
landmark statute rarely arise, at least with regard to the legitimacy
of the ends. 9
11. See infra notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
12. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 63-145 and accompanying text.
14. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132; see also Sackman, Landmark Cases on Landmark
Law, 1979 INST. ON PLANNING, ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 241, 247.
15. Sackman, supra note 14, at 247.
16. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
17. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); see also Riesel, Aesthetis as a Basisfor
Regulation, 1 PACE L. REv. 629, 629 (1981) (recognizing the validity of aesthetics as a
separate ground for land use regulation). While health and safety were initially the main
objectives of the police power, the term "general welfare" now includes appearance, envi-
ronment, community character, and maintenance of neighboring property values. Develop-
ments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427, 1445-47 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Zoning]. One commentator has argued that the concept of "aesthetics" is so amorphous
that it may be used to justify more than the court intended. Id. at 1450.
18. Zoning, supra note 17, at 1444.
19. Since 1928, the Court has never invalidated a zoning ordinance as exceeding the
state's police power. Id. at 1443. Since state courts have generally failed to distinguish
between the constitutional limits on the police power and the limits on zoning power im-
posed by state enabling legislation, id. at 1444, "even a court which rigorously scrutinizes
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Urban landmark statutes typically seek to benefit the commu-
nity by fostering civic pride, stimulating the city's economy, and
educating the city's residents.2" Through such statutes municipali-
ties seek to encourage private owners to preserve properties, since
acquisition by the municipality itself would be costly.2 Yet the
cost to private landowners may also be burdensome.22
B. Interaction of Federal, State, and Local Law
1. Federal Law
Enactment of the National Historic Preservation Act of 196623
reflects the trend toward stronger protection of historic buildings.
This federal law empowers the Secretary of the Interior to "main-
tain a National Register of Historic Places composed of districts,
sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American his-
tory, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture."24 Sites
which have no particular national importance may still qualify for
listing so long as they meet the criteria for what is "historic."25
Although the National Register was developed merely as a plan-
ning aid and not as a regulatory control, many local ordinances
the factual connection between a zoning measure and an asserted goal may invalidate very
few ordinances." Id. at 1445.
20. See, e.g., NEw YORK Crry, N.Y., CHARTER & CODE ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0(b) (1976
& Supp. 1983-84). In Penn Central, Justice Brennan noted that landmark buildings "repre-
sent the lessons of the past and... serve as examples of quality for today." 438 U.S. at
108.
21. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 108. Public ownership of landmark properties reduces a
municipality's tax base. Acquisition and maintenance costs further deplete the public treas-
ury. Wilson & Winkler, The Response of State Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 329, 339 (1971).
22. The financial drain avoided by the city may be passed on to the private land-
owner. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
23. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470b,
470c-470n (1982).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A) (1982).
25. Robinson, Historic Preservation Law. The Metes and Bounds of a New Field, I
PACE L. REv. 511, 524 (1981). The Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to "establish
or revise criteria for properties to be included on the National Register and criteria for
National Historic Landmarks." 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(B)(2) (1982). To qualify for listing
in the National Register, the "quality of significance in American history, architecture,
archeology, engineering and culture [must be] present in. . .buildings.., that possess
integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association." 36
C.F.R. § 60.4 (1983). The buildings must be associated with significant historical events or
persons, reflect "high artistic values" or a distinctive style, or be apt to contain important
historical information. Id. Generally, buildings less than 50 years old are ineligible, but
there are exceptions, including "religious property deriving primary significance from ar-
chitectural or artistic distinction or historical importance." Id.
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regulate property according to Register guidelines.26
2. State and Local Law
A municipality normally enacts an ordinance27 pursuant to au-
thority granted by the state's enabling act.28 Together, the act and
the ordinance empower local government to create historic dis-
tricts and isolated landmarks.29 They also provide for the creation
of local landmarks commissions authorized to oversee historic
preservation of the exterior features of landmarks. 30 While states
also have historic registers which are used only as planning tools,
jurisdiction over private action in the historic preservation area
rests entirely with local government.31
C. Due Process and Eminent Domain Challenges
Due process and eminent domain challenges to the regulation
of land used by religious institutions have been numerous.32  At
least one Supreme Court decision indicates that such challenges
differ only in degree.33 A state's exercise of its police power may
26. Robinson, supra note 25, at 524.
27. Local ordinances commonly (1) set forth criteria for what is historic, (2) authorize
the establishment of a commission to apply the criteria, (3) create an inventory of historic
structures, sites, and districts, (4) assemble evaluations for potential landmarks or districts,
(5) provide for notice and hearing, (6) establish administrative appeal procedures, (7) pro-
vide for specific detailing of a landmark's identity, (8) require a certificate of appropriate-
ness before alteration of the landmark is allowed, (9) provide for commission review before
any building over a specified age (typically 30 years) may be demolished, and (10) impose
affirmative maintenance obligations on the landmark's owner. Id. at 532-33 n.100; see,
e.g., Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978, D.C. CODE ch. 10,
§§ 5-1001 to 5-1015 (Michie 1981); Preservation of Landmarks and Historic Districts, NEw
YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER & CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976 & Supp.
1983-84); Historic Buildings, PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES
§ 14-2008 (1956); ST. Louis, Mo., HERITAGE AND URBAN DESIGN CODE, Ordinance
57,986, REV. CODE ch. 24, § 895 (1980).
28. Typically, the enabling act states the policy behind historic preservation and em-
powers municipalities to "designate and administer historic districts and landmarks[,]...
grant tax concessions [to the owners of historic properties, and] acquire or condemn his-
toric properties." Kelogg, Role of State and Local Laws and Programs in Historic Preserva-
tion, 12 URB. LAW. 31, 40 (1980).
29. Wilson & Winkler, supra note 21, at 336-37.
30. Generally, regulations do not cover either the design or the use of the building's
interior, and limit the municipality to imposing those maintenance obligations contained in
the local building, fire, and health ordinances. Id. at 337.
31. Marsh & Simon, The Protection of Historic Resources in New York State: An Over-
view of Federal, State and Local Laws, 10 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 411, 419 (1982).
32. See supra note 9.
33. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922).
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be valid on due process 34 grounds, yet if that same regulation
"goes too far" it may be deemed an exercise of the eminent do-
main power, compensable under the fifth amendment.35
To satisfy due process, a landmark law must have legitimate
ends, and the means employed must be reasonably related to the
accomplishment of those ends.36 The legitimacy of state objec-
tives has long been upheld in this area,37 but reasonableness of
means can only be assessed in the context of a specific factual
situation. 8
Even though an ordinance is reasonably related to legitimate
ends, it may still violate the fifth amendment.39 If the law creates
such interference that it deprives the landowner of reasonable,
beneficial use of the property, a taking occurs and the government
must pay just compensation. 4 Courts4 and commentators42 have
34. The 14th amendment provides in part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. The fifth amendment provides in part, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. In
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), the Court held
the fifth amendment applicable to the states through the 14th amendment.
36. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928) (governmental power
to regulate land use is not unlimited and cannot be imposed absent a substantial relation to
the public good). Nectow involved a zoning regulation, and since landmark law is deemed
to be a form of zoning, the principle is applicable here. See supra text accompanying note
14.
37. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
38. Compare Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 522, 136 N.E.2d
827, 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 858 (1956) (denial of plaintiffs application for permit to build
church bore no substantial relationship to promotion of community's health, safety, wel-
fare, and morals) and Congregation Comm., N. Fort Worth Congreg., Jehovah's Witnesses
v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d at 704-05 (same), with Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (city's compre-
hensive plan was substantially related to protection of health, safety, welfare, and morals of
community). The courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the landmarks
commission regarding a building's historic or architectural significance. One commentator
has asserted that under the New York City law "[o]bjecting landowners.. . have an al-
most insurmountable burden in establishing that the Landmarks Commission acted arbi-
trarily in its designation proceeding." Comment, Beyond the Taking Issue: Emerging
Procedural Due Process Issues in Local Landmark Preservation Programs, 10 FORDHAM
URB. LJ. 441, 455 (1982).
39. Zoning, supra note 17, at 1462.
40. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-38. If the entire property is taken, compensa-
tion is measured by the property's fair market value. If only a portion is taken, the land-
owner receives the value before taking minus the value after taking. D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 771 (2d ed. 1980).
41. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962); Mfahon, 260 U.S. 393; Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes
for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975) (arguing
1983]
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struggled to define the attributes of a taking, but as the Supreme
Court has acknowledged, there is "no set formula to determine
where regulation ends and taking begins. '43 The courts must con-
sider each case on its particular facts.'
Due process and eminent domain will undoubtedly continue
to be used in challenging landmark designations of religious
properties. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons for permit-
ting attacks on first amendment grounds.45 The preferred status of
religious freedom46 gives the owner of restricted church property a
potent weapon for invalidating its landmark designation.47
for a middle ground between police power and eminent domain power consisting of "ac-
commodation power"); Gerstell, Needed- .4 Landmark Decision-Takings, Landmark
Preservation and Social Cost, 8 URB. LAW. 213 (1976) (summarizing various taking tests
and presenting alternatives); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967) (detailing
the factors that determine when a taking has occurred); Sax, Takings andthe Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) (distinguishing between government's arbitral and enterprisal ca-
pacities and arguing that only the latter may result in takings).
43. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594.
44. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. In the context of religious buildings, compare Society for
Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 456, 415 N.E.2d 922, 925-26, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932,
936 (1980) (no taking if landmark designation bars only most lucrative use of property),
with Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 132, 316 N.E.2d 305, 312, 359
N.Y.S.2d 7, 17 (1974) (taking occurred where building was totally inadequate for owner's
legitimate needs and landmark designation prevented demolition). Both of these courts
relied on Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314
(1968), which held that the proper test for a taking of a charitable organization's property
was whether "maintenance of the landmark either physically or financially prevents or
seriously interferes with carrying out the charitable purpose." 29 A.D.2d at 378, 288
N.Y.S.2d at 316. The Spati court distinguished Lutheran Church, stating that the plaintiff
there had established that nothing short of demolition would resolve its problems, while
the plaintiff in Spatt had failed to show the need for such drastic action.
As one commentator points out, Spati and Lutheran Church, both involving properties
owned by religious organizations, were handled by the courts with little or no reference to
potential first amendment concerns. Comment, First Amendment Challenges to Landmark
Preservation Statutes, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 126-31 (1982).
45. See infra notes 63-146 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that a pro-
cedural due process attack may be advanced. See Comment, supra note 38. There are two
main areas where this may occur: first, it may be argued that a local ordinance contains
insufficiently detailed standards for determining whether a property qualifies for landmark
status; second, there may be allegations that the notice, hearing, and review provisions are
inadequate. See, e.g., Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 851-56
(E.D. Va. 1980); see also Wilson & Winkler, supra note 21, at 338. One local group has
charged that its municipal landmarks commission often designated churches as landmarks
regardless of historic or architectural value. COMMITTEE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERFAITH COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
LANDMARKING OF RELIGIOUS PROPERTY 8-9 (1982); see also Comment, supra note 44, at
121-22.
46. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 63-146 and accompanying text.
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II. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,48 the Supreme Court held the free
exercise clause49 applicable to the states and established that the
first amendment "embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but. . . the second cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of soci-
ety.""0 The Court has distinguished between laws with distinctly
secular purposes which affect citizens regardless of religious affili-
ation,5 ' and laws which inhibit actions important to the practice of
particular religions.52 The Court has not tolerated, the latter; to-
ward the former it has been more deferential. If a state passes a
law of general application which operates to burden a religious
practice,5 3 courts will uphold the law provided it regulates secular
activity54 and is the least restrictive means by which the state may
accomplish its goals or protect its interests.55
The Court more fully developed its test for infringement of
free exercise in Sherbert v. Verner.56 Once it is satisfied that a
48. 310 U.S. 296, 304, 306 (1940) (religious action may be regulated for society's pro-
tection but no such protection required where Jehovah's Witness merely distributed reli-
gious literature on city street).
49. See supra note 1.
50. 310 U.S. at 303-04. But see infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
51. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (state's denial of unemployment compensation to
worker based on her religiously motivated refusal to work on Saturdays unconstitutional);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday upheld as uniform day of rest despite
economic effect on retailers whose Sabbath was Saturday).
52. See, ag., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (statute disqualifying ministers
from public office unconstitutional); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (statute re-
quiring notary to take oath of belief in God unconstitutional).
53. In Braunfeld, for instance, a statute prohibiting retailers from doing Sunday busi-
ness addressed, by its terms, those who engaged in certain sales activity, not those who
practiced certain faiths. While the law was of general application, it meant that Orthodox
Jews, whose Sabbath was Saturday, lost two days of business a week instead of one. The
burden on religious practice was evident, since it forced Jews to choose between earning a
livelihood and observing the Sabbath. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the statute, noting
that the law did not prohibit religious practices (direct burden) but just made them more
expensive (indirect burden). 366 U.S. at 605.
54. See supra note 53.
55. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607. In International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness v.
Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981), the court suggested alternative protective measures
which were less restrictive of the Krishnas' practices than the challenged statute prohibiting
roving solicitation at state fairs. Because alternatives existed, the court refused to enforce
the statute. Id. at 446-47.
56. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court held the law invalid as applied to a worker even
though the burden on religions practice was indirect. Id. at 403-04. Though the Court in
Braunfeld seemed reluctant to invalidate a law on the basis of an indirect burden, 366 U.S.
at 606, it did state that it would do so if "the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the
19831
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religious belief is sincerely held,57 the Court examines the rela-
tionship between the belief and the religious conduct at issue." If
there is a sufficient nexus, the Court then asks whether the chal-
lenged statute or govenmental action infringes on the practi-
tioner's free exercise of religion. 9 If an infringement is found, the
state must justify it by identifying a compelling state interest6" and
showing that there is no less restrictive means of protecting that
interest.61
The state's burden is heavy. Perhaps for that reason "churches
are being advised to lay less emphasis on property rights under the
due process clause and more on religious liberty under the First
Amendment.
62
III. FREE EXERCISE IN CONFLICT WITH LANDMARK LAW
This section of the Note examines the conflict between free
exercise and landmark law in the context of four hypothetical fact
observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions ......
Id. at 607 (emphasis added); see also P. KAUPER, supra note 4, at 42.
57. While the validity of a particular belief is not questioned in a free exercise inquiry,
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944), the sincerity of that belief is relevant.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972); see also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,
720, 394 P.2d 813, 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73 (1964) (upholding sacramental use of peyote in
part because of worshipers' sincere belief that the drug was central to their religious
ceremony).
58. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the
religious activity is central to the practitioners' faith. In upholding the right of Amish
families to educate their teen-age children at home despite a state statute requiring school
attendance, the Yoder Court noted that the beliefs which promoted such conduct were
"shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living." Id. The Court also
observed that the beliefs were related to Amish interpretation of religious literature, and
had shaped Amish lifestyle for a substantial period of time. Id.; see also Woody, 61 Cal.2d
at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (noting the longevity of the Native American
Church and that Church members were upstanding citizens of the Indian community).
59. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. In addition to Sherbert and Yoder, the Court found
infringement in McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626 (statute disqualifying ministers from serving as
state legislators), and Torcaso, 367 U.S. 488 (statute requiring notary to take oath of belief
in God).
60. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. The Court has found compelling state interests in a
variety of situations. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (maintaining
viability of social security system); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (uniform day of rest);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (protecting minors through child labor laws);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination against disease); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (sanctity of monogamous marriage).
61. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407; see supra note 55.
62. J. CURRY, PUBLIc REGULATION OF THE RELIGIOUS USE OF LAND 239-40 (1964).
Curry treats only cases in which religious organizations have been excluded from specified
zones, but his principles are applicable in the landmark area as well. See infra notes
64-146 and accompanying text.
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patterns.63 Each involves a church that is an isolated landmark
rather than a component of a historic district.
A. Background
Church A alleges that its considerable financial problems stem
primarily from its landmark status. It predicts bankruptcy by cen-
tury's end. As a solution, the congregation proposes to raze its ad-
jacent building, also a landmark, and erect in its place a
multistory office tower which will provide the church with reve-
nues sufficient to ensure financial stability. Income from the office
tower would also be used to support the congregation's ministry to
the poor. The new building would also provide space for the
church's human service activities. Church A has few problems
with its physical plant. The buildings are old and would be less
expensive to maintain if renovation were permitted, but the con-
gregation's needs have not yet exceeded the buildings' capacity.
Church A's application to the landmarks commission for permis-
sion to demolish the adjacent building has been rejected.' 4
Church B's problems are also financial, but its proposed solu-
tion is relocation. When Church B was constructed in a rural set-
ting many years ago, the members of its congregation lived
nearby. Today the church stands in the center of a distinctly urban
area, and almost all of its members have moved to the suburbs,
more than half an hour away. Church B would like to sell its
property and erect a new building closer to its congregation. Be-
cause its vigorous attempts to interest buyers have all failed,
Church B has applied to the local landmarks commission for per-
mission to raze the building so that the property will be more at-
tractive to commercial developers. Permission has been denied.
Meanwhile, Church B's services are poorly attended because of
the long commute, and the resulting loss in revenues has put a
severe strain on the church's budget.
Church C's problems are spatial. The house of worship itself
63. The elements of each hypothetical fact pattern are summarized in the Appendix to
this Note.
64. This hypothetical closely parallels the situation of St. Bartholomew's Episcopal
Church in New York City, which has proposed to erect a 59-story office tower over its
adjacent community house. The church has predicted that it will realize $9.5 million in the
first 10 years; otherwise, it will be bankrupt by the end of the century. Current New York
City ordinances prohibit the project. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1983, at 1, col. 3; see also
Holubowich, Landmark Preservatior" Battleground for the 80"s, 68 A.B.A . 19 (1982);
Comment, supra note 44. See generaly N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1984, at 17,'cols. 1, 4 (editori-
als for and against St. Bartholomew's proposal).
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is not at issue. Rather, the parish house next door, which is owned
by the church and shares its landmark status, is woefully inade-
quate for the church's needs. The parish house contains the
church offices, a day care center, a soup kitchen for the poor, and
classrooms for religious instruction. Instead of demolishing the
parish house, the church wants to erect an addition atop it to meet
the needs of its rapidly growing congregation. Three separate
proposals for the alteration have been submitted to the landmarks
commission and all have been rejected.
Church D is a small sect of one of the world's major religions.
In this country only a dozen other congregations share its tenets,
and none is within five hundred miles of Church D. Church D's
congregation has grown dramatically in recent years to the point
where its house of worship is totally inadequate. Because of the
church's age and severe structural deterioration, renovation would
be infeasible and far too costly. Instead, Church D desires to re-
build, and has applied to the landmarks commission for a demoli-
tion permit. Permission has been denied.
In the context of these four fact patterns, will the courts uphold
free exercise challenges to the landmark designations? The first
step is to determine in each case whether the designation burdens
religion.65
B. Burdens on Free Exercise: Churches A, B, C, and D
To determine whether governmental action burdens a congre-
gation's right to the free exercise of religion, 66 courts will first ex-
amine the nature of the religious practice and its relationship to
religious beliefs. 67  Application of landmark law to religious
properties places an indirect burden on free exercise since such
ordinances regulate practice rather than belief.
65. The following discussion deals not with the rights of individuals per se, but with
the rights of a congregation to practice its religion collectively regardless of whether the
applicable landmark law is a reasonable exercise of the police power. The discussion is
based on several assumptions. First, it assumes that landmark laws are generally valid as
legitimate exercises of the state's power, reasonably related to the protection of the health,
safety, and welfare of the community. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. Sec-
ond, it assumes that the religions denomination is traditional and well established, with
sincerely held beliefs. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. (If sincerity of belief were
doubted, the religious body would encounter serious problems in challenging a valid exer-
cise of the police power.) Third, it assumes that each church is located in an urban area
which was rural or semirural when the church was first constructed.
66. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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1. The Belief-Practice Nexus
To warrant first amendment protection, the church must estab-
lish a sufficient nexus between its religious belief and the practice
in question.6 8 The Cantwell distinction between belief and ac-
tion,6 9 however, has been blurred by the Supreme Court in recent
years. In 1978, Justice Brennan declared: "Clearly freedom of be-
lief protected by the Free Exercise Clause embraces freedom to
profess or practice that belief."7 Six years earlier the Court had
indicated that although religious activity must generally yield to
the state's exercise of its police power, there are areas of religious
conduct beyond the police power's reach.7" Yoder nevertheless in-
dicates that first amendment protection will be afforded only
when the religious practice is closely tied to belief.72
The types of religious activity at issue in the hypothetical fact
patterns fall into two main categories: worship itself, and related,
or secondary, practices. Churches A and D face problems that
threaten their communal worship services. In A's case, the inter-
ference with worship is anticipated in the future, and preventive
action is necessary. Church D's problem is more immediate; the
overcrowding caused by the rapid growth of its congregation has
turned its worship service into the antithesis of the solemn, reflec-
tive occasion it is meant to be-and Church D has no alternative
facility to accommodate the overflow. The Supreme Court has
declared that "worship in the churches and preaching from the
68. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21. For examples of sufficient nexus, see Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 394 P.2d 814, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (finding peyote central to Native American Church's
faith); Montgomery v. Board of Retirement, 33 Cal. App. 3d 447, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973)
(belief in divine healing sufficiently important to practitioner's faith to entitle her to disa-
bility retirement benefits despite her religiously-motivated refusal to undergo potentially
life-saving surgery). For an example of insufficient nexus, see People v. Mullins, 50 Cal.
App. 3d 61, 123 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1975) (insufficient proof that marijuana was central to
religion).
69. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
70. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring ) (referring to minister's right
both to practice his career and run for public office). At the same time, Justice Brennan
cautioned the Court to be wary of broadening the scope of first amendment protection,
"since to do so might leave government powerless to vindicate compelling state interests."
Id. at 627 n.7. For a discussion of compelling state interests, see infra notes 95-132 and
accompanying text.
71. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; see also Note, Government Noninvolvement with Religious
Institutions, 59 TEx. L. Rav. 921, 923 n.22 (1981) (noting that Justice Brennan's application
of free exercise protection was in context of a statute which burdened on the basis of reli-
gious status, whereas Yoder dealt with burden imposed by religiously neutral law).
72. 406 U.S. at 218.
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pulpits" occupy a "high estate' 7 3 under the first amendment.
Since the communal service is the focal point of many of the
world's religions,74 there is a sufficient link between belief and
practice to bring the worship service within the first amendment's
protective sphere.
Church B's communal worship is hampered only for those in-
dividuals who make up B's present congregation. Because most
of its members now live in the suburbs, Church B has lost its abil-
ity to unite them in a religious community. Presumably, however,
facilities of the same denomination may be found in the suburbs.
Moreover, the congregation has not been denied the ability or the
opportunity to commute to the urban church.
The landmark law has affected Church C's day care center,
soup kitchen, and religous classes, all of which are components of
its ministry to the poor. InMurdock v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme
Court held that hand distribution of religious literature, as a form
of proselytizing, was as highly protected as worship itself.75 More
recently the Court extended its definition of religion to include
"beliefs that are purely ethical and moral in source and content
but that nevertheless impose . . . a duty of conscience."76
If ministry to the poor is seen both as a means of spreading
"the Word" and as a means of actually heeding "the Word," this
so-called secondary activity deserves protection whether it ema-
nates from distinctly religious beliefs or from a deeply felt moral
duty. Indeed, ministry to the poor has been described as "the very
73. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943).
74. See J. MCKENZIE, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH 164-65 (1971); M. STEIN-
BERG, BASIC JUDAISM 117-18 (1947); J.P. WILLIAMS, WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE AND
How THEY WORSHIP 123-24 (3d ed. 1969) (Protestantism); id. at 396-97 (Mormonism); id.
at 421-22 (Christian Science); see also W. ToRPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS IN AMERICA 148-49 (1970) (discussing common law right to religious assembly and
subsequent statutory protection of that right).
75. 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943).
76. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (refusal to submit to induction
into Armed Forces upheld where conscientious objection was based not on traditional
"religious" beliefs but on principles gleaned from readings in history, philosophy, and soci-
ology). One commentator stated that "so long as the courts can justify an activity as inci-
dental to the doctrines, practices or rules of a religious organization, that activity will be
construed to be.. . religious." Comment, Judicial Defnition of Relgious Use in Zoning
Cases, 1973 UR. L. ANN. 291, 298. Another commentator emphasized the relevance of a
"church related purpose" when a religious organization's use of property is restricted.
Note, Urban Landmarks: Preserving Our Cities' Aesthetic and Cultural Resources, 39 AL-
BANY L. REV. 521, 542 (1975) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Urban Landmarks].
One court has even indicated that certain forms of entertainment fall within the scope of
religious activity. Community Synagogue v. Bates, I N.Y.2d 445, 453, 136 N.E.2d 488, 493,
154 N.Y.S.2d 15, 22 (1956).
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essence of the Christian ministry,"" and "divine worship and
human service" as the "two fundamentals of our faith.""8 Assum-
ing, then, that each hypothetical church has at least some claim to
the first amendment's protection, the next determination is
whether the landmark law interferes with free exercise.
2. Burdens on Free Exercise
The alleged burdens on Churches A and B are financial, while
those on Churches C and D are spatial. The Braunfeld majority
asserted that a statute making religious practice more costly while
regulating secular activity is not objectionable on first amendment
grounds79 since it does not prohibit the religious practice itself810
Yet the majority went on to say that obstruction of religious prac-
tice that is the effect if not the purpose of a law will not be toler-
ated.81 Two dissenting Justices in Braunfeld reasoned that
extreme economic hardship represents undue infringement if the
believer is forced to choose between practicing religion and stay-
ing in business.8 2 In addition, the Murdock Court noted with dis-
approval government's power to impose such expenses on a
religious practice which "can make its exercise so costly as to de-
prive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance."83
Undoubtedly, houses of worship are subject to reasonable zon-
77. Letter to the author from Sterling Newell, Jr., Chancellor of the Episcopal Diocese
of Ohio (March 28, 1983) (on ifie with the Case Western Reserve Law Review).
78. Letter from the Real Estate Committee of St. Bartholomew's Episcopal Church,
New York City, to St. Bartholomew's parishioners (May 10, 1981) (discussing the alterna-
tives open to this financially troubled landmark church) (on file with the Case Western
Reserve Law Review).
79. 366 U.S. at 605; see supra note 53.
80. 366 U.S. at 606.
81. See discussion of Braunfeld supra note 56.
82. 366 U.S. at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 616 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
83. 319 U.S. at 112; see also Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488,
239 N.E.2d 891, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1968) (unnecessary $100,000 burden imposed by local
zoning ordinances setback requirements was infringement of free exercise). One commen-
tator has remarked that the severity of the financial burden in Westchester may well have
been what motivated the court to find undue infringement. Recent Developments: Constitu-
tional Law-Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment Protects Houses of Worship from
Restrictive Zoning Ordinances, 44 FORDHAm L. REv. 1245, 1255 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Free Exercise]. Another has noted the New York Court of Appeals' refusal to force an
owner to preserve the landmark property "without any relief or adequate compensation,
when the designation imposes a burden." Comment, Landmarks Preservation and Tax-
Exempt Organizations: A Proposal in Response to Lutheran Church, 1 COLuM. J. ENrIL.
L. 274, 289 (1975).
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ing restrictions,84 but when those restrictions threaten a congrega-
tion's existence, religious practice is clearly burdened. The
Sherbert Court based its invalidation of state law in part on the
resulting "pressure . . .to forego [religious] practice." 5 Church
A ultimately faces the same sort of pressure. Despite the fact that
landmark laws are laws of general application, they must be ex-
amined in the context of particular circumstances; where the effect
is a religious organization's bankruptcy, there would appear to be
an intolerable infringement of free exercise. Since landmark laws
normally impose an affirmative duty on the landmark owner to
maintain the subject building at a certain level of repair, 6 Church
A will eventually have to close its doors if its landmark status
continues. While an adjacent building is creating the problem for
Church 4, the effect will be the inhibition of worship itself. Thus,
it would seem that a demolition permit should be granted unless
the state can show an interest justifying such a heavy burden. 7
Church B's burden is less severe than Church 4's. Although
the inability to sell its landmarked property drains its coffers, al-
ternative preventive measures may exist. The church must de-
velop a new urban congregation whose contributions would
enable it to function in its current setting. The present congrega-
tion may argue that the issue is not the mere maintenance of a
building but the vitality of its communal worshipping unit. The
response to this assertion is that a move to the surburbs itself in-
volves the breaking of bonds-an individual parishioner's deci-
sion to relocate as a matter of personal choice does not give that
individual the legal right to have the church relocated in the pro-
cess. If the communal unit is essential, the worshippers can either
remain in the city or endure the weekly commute from the
suburbs.
Church B's infringement claim would be stronger if it were
unable to attract an urban congregation or if its new congregation
were completely unable to support the building. In either case,
the church would have to bear the cost of a building that does
nothing but diminish its resources. The landmark designation
would operate not only to burden free exercise, taking needed dol-
lars away from religious programs, but also to restrain alienation
84. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 555.
85. 374 U.S. at 404.
86. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 547-50.
87. See infra notes 97-132 and accompanying text.
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of property and discourage its productive use.ss
It is also possible that the landmark designation would deter
potential members from joining the church when they discover
that their religious contributions will be used for maintaining the
building at a certain level of repair.8 9 Thus, the landmark
designation would obstruct not only the formation of a unit capa-
ble of ensuring solvency, but also the dissemination of the reli-
gious message, which is a protected component of the free exercise
guarantee.90
Church D faces a dilemma similar to Church B's-it is bur-
dened with a structure that cannot accommodate its existing con-
gregation. Church D's members, however, have nowhere else to
go. In the context of urban renewal, the Colorado Supreme Court
allowed the razing of a church where the church was not sui
generis, was not the birthplace of a particular denomination, and
was not the mother church.91 The court also noted that there were
several other places of worship in the same area available to the
congregants.92 Thus, it seems that courts will be more willing to
defend a singular facility or one which has special meaning for a
denomination.
Church D is sui generis. Its members "must either abandon
belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to mi-
grate to some other and more tolerant region."93 The Yoder
Court, which looked upon such a choice with disapproval, 94
would surely find that a move of 500 miles or more would impose
undue hardship-yet that is the only option open to Church D's
members if denial of the demolition permit is allowed to stand.
Church C's parish house must expand if its ministry to the
poor is to continue. A congregation seeking to protect buildings
other than its house of worship bears a heavier burden in justify-
ing first amendment coverage.95 Nonetheless, if Church C can
88. The latter two effects would not be germane to the free exercise challenge, but to a
due process or eminent domain claim. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
They are mentioned here only to emphasize the potential severity of infringement.
89. See Comment, supra note 44, at 122.
90. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 108-09.
91. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Pillar of Fire, 191 Colo. 238, 240-41,552 P.2d 23,
24-25 (1976).
92. Id. at 240, 552 P.2d at 25.
93. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
94. Id.
95. See Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 456, 415 N.E.2d 922, 926,
434 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 (1980). The court in Spatt upheld the landmark status of a school
building owned by the religious organization, but indicated that if the Society's meeting
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show that its nonworship activities are as central to its faith as
communal prayer meetings, its infringement claim will be
viable.96
C. Weighing the State's Interest Against the Churches'
Once a burden on the free exercise of religion is found, courts
will allow it to continue only if the state can show an interest suffi-
ciently compelling to justify infringement.97 The Sherbert Court
noted that "'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount in-
terests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' "98 Although the
state clearly has an interest in protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of the community through the use of its police power,99
the critical question is whether that interest outweighs a congrega-
tion's right to the free exercise of religion."°°
A typical purpose of municipal landmark law is "fostering
'civic pride in the beauty and noble accomplishments of the
past.' ,,ao That most landmarks commissions regulate only the
exterior of subject buildings 0 2 suggests that the primary motiva-
tion for landmarking is the preservation of aesthetics. Originally,
aesthetics was not a permissible independent object of police
power protection. 10 3 While aesthetics has since been included in
the police power's penumbra,"° it remains doubtful whether
house itself were at issue there might be first amendment problems. This assertion seems
rebuttable when it is the drain caused by the adjacent building that affects the inability to
worship, as in Church A's case.
96. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. The argument is certainly stronger
than some that have been unsuccessfully attempted. See, e.g., Lafayette Park Baptist
Church v. Board of Adjustment, 599 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (demolition of
landmark townhouse was proposed to make room for parking lot, day care facility, and
recreational space); First Presbyterian Church v. City Council, 25 Pa. Commw. 154, 360
A.2d 257 (1976) (demolition of landmark building was proposed to make way for landscap-
ing and parking lot).
97. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
98. 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
99. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
100. This is the heart of the Supreme Court's balancing test, expounded in Sherbert
and Yoder. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
101. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 109 (1978) (quoting NEW
YORK CiTy, N.Y., CHARTER AND CODE ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0(b) (1976)).
102. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
104. "It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy .... " Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); see also
Riesel, supra note 17, at 629 (asserting that it is no longer necessary to "mask aesthetic
concerns as public health, safety or welfare, in order to articulate a valid basis for
regulation").
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purely aesthetic concerns should be allowed to predominate over
a congregation's religious rights. As one commentator has sug-
gested, an interest in protecting aesthetics should not outweigh the
state's interest in reducing its control over religious uses of
property. 10 5
It may even be argued that while landmark laws purport to
promote aesthetics, they actually defeat that purpose in the con-
text of religious buildings. By placing an economic burden on reli-
gious landowners, the law may well discourage those who are
currently building churches from erecting aesthetically pleasing
structures for fear that an eventual landmark designation might
someday lead to financial collapse. °6
The courts have typically found interests sufficiently compel-
ling to justify infringement in cases where religious conduct poses
a "substantial threat to . ..public safety, peace or order." 10 7
When the state exercises its police power, it acts to protect the
public health, safety, welfare, or morals. 108 Religious activity that
threatens no one, such as meditation or prayer, is beyond the
reach of the police power. But religious activity that has a poten-
tially harmful impact on society must yield to regulation for the
public good.
Religiously motivated activities which the courts have found
to constitute such a threat include child labor, polygamy, refusal
to be vaccinated against disease or accept blood transfusions, and
105. Urban Landmarks, supra note 76, at 543; see also Note, Eminent Domain" Consti-
tutionalProblems in the Taking of Church Lands, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 191, 195 (1978) (argu-
ing that functional importance rather than fame or aesthetics should be deciding factor).
Although this argument was raised in the urban renewal context, its principle remains ap-
plicable because the same interests are involved. Whether the context is urban renewal or
landmarking, the city's interest in health, safety, and welfare is on one side of the balance
and a congregation's right to religious freedom is on the other.
In the taking context, one writer has suggested that in upholding a church's right to a
demolition permit, the Lutheran Church court may have been saying that the "preservation
of buildings of questionable historic or architectural value is not a public purpose under the
police power." Note, Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the Single Landmark, 25 Da_
PAUL L. Rnv. 160, 173 (1975) (referring to Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35
N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1975)) (emphasis in original). Even if the
historic or architectural value is unquestioned, the preeminent status of religious freedom
would seem to outweigh the interest in aesthetics and historic preservation.
106. Where such a burden exists, the value of a landmark designation as a public bene-
fit diminishes noticeably "[t]o the extent that landmark preservation is aesthetically moti-
vated." Gerstell, supra note 42, at 241.
107. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; see supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also Com-
ment, Zoning Ordinances, Private Religious Conduct, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 76
Nw. U.L. Rv. 786, 794 (1981).
108. See supra notes 2 & 15-18 and accompanying text.
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handling of poisonous snakes.'0 9 The landmark churches can be
distinguished from these cases. In zoning cases, where a church's
exclusion from a residential area has been held unconstitutional,
the holdings were based primarily on a finding that the religious
conduct posed no threat to the surrounding community's wel-
fare. 10 It may be argued that the demolition of landmark
churches and their adjacent properties threatens the community's
interest in historic and architectural preservation. But given the
large number of landmarked religious properties"'I and the infre-
quency of demolitions, the threat seems minimal, particularly
when the community's interest is weighed against the congrega-
tion's right to free exercise." 2
Another state interest in preserving historic properties is the
"curbing [of] urban blight attributable to overcrowding."'"1 3
Landmarking supposedly accomplishes this goal by minimizing
the development of high density buildings."l 4 Protection of public
welfare certainly entails guarding against traffic congestion, noise
pollution, and overcrowding." 5 Nevertheless, courts must also
consider that many of the religious activities of landmarked
churches supplement the state's own human service programs.
The state has an interest, for example, in Church C's feeding and
sheltering of the poor because it reduces the burden on the state's
welfare rolls. If the state's interest in "curbing urban blight" were
109. See supra note 60; In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.) (court ordered blood transfusion for mother of young child over her religiously
motivated objections), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Heston,
58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (young single adult near death required to receive blood
transfusions despite religiously motivated objections); Swam v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99
(Tenn. 1975) (upholding state statute prohibiting handling of poisonous snakes), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948) (snake
handling threatens peace, order, and morals regardless of any religious motivation).
110. See American Friends of Soc'y of St. Pius v. Schwab, 68 A.D.2d 646, 417
N.Y.S.2d 991, appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 611 (1979); Congregation Comm., N. Fort Worth
Congreg., Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
111. In New York City alone, approximately 125 religious properties have been given
landmark status by the local landmarks commission. LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COM-
MISSION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, A GUIDE TO NEW YORK CITY LANDMARKS (1979).
112. A commentator notes that reasonable laws for protection of the health, safety, and
welfare of the community are generally upheld against free exercise challenges because
these laws do not directly restrict "free expression of ideas." He adds, however, that this
does not necessarily make such laws valid as applied; it only means that "religious liberty
furnishes no ground for claiming [general] immunity" from them. P. KAUPER, supra note
4, at 38.
113. Urban Landmarks, supra note 76, at 525.
114. Id.
115. See generally Euclid, 272 U.S. 365.
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allowed to override Church C's right to practice its urban minis-
try, the church would be unable to provide these needed
services. 116
The Supreme Court also has found a compelling state interest
where maintenance of a system as a whole depends on mandatory
compliance and necessitates a yielding of religious activity to reg-
ulation.' 17 In Braunfeld, the Court emphasized the need for a uni-
form day of rest for all citizens, regardless of religious
affiliation.' 18 In United States v. Lee, the Court found that since
mandatory compliance was essential to the vitality of the social
security system, the state's interest outweighed an Amish em-
ployer's religiously motivated refusal to participate in the sys-
tem.'19 In each case, the Court was faced with a situation in which
the state objective would have failed unless mass participation
were achieved. Thus, the Court required the religious practice to
yield to regulation for the good of society as a whole.
In the context of religious property, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that demolishing a church building is a legitimate ex-
ercise of police power when the state's urban renewal plan would
be defeated absent area-wide renovation.' 20 The need for main-
taining an overall system or plan has also been deemed a compel-
116. Also to be weighed against the municipality's interest is the possibility that
churches seeking relief from landmark status may find ways to make the alteration or dem-
olition more attractive to the municipality. At St. Bartholomew's in New York City, the
developer of the proposed office tower has offered to spend 30% more than normal on the
construction "because of the special circumstances." Holubowich, supra note 64, at 20
(quoting a member of St. Bartholomew's vestry). Such concessions weaken the city's inter-
est in maintaining the landmark building by providing a counterinterest in razing it.
117. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
118. 366 U.S. at 607-09.
119. 455 U.S. 252, 256-61 (1982). The Amish oppose the social security system on the
grounds that it is their own religious duty to provide for their poor and elderly. Id. at 257.
In distinguishing Yoder, the Lee majority asserted that a religious exemption from social
security taxes would be deleterious in a way that excusing Amish children from the latter
part of their public school education would not. In the former case, an exemption for the
Amish would create a precedent for religious objections to the way tax revenues are spent.
Exemption for all such claims would gravely threaten not only the social security system
but the income tax system as well. In the latter case, the public education system would
continue to thrive if isolated Amish children were allowed to be educated at home. Be-
cause the Yoder Court emphasized that the Amish can educate their children as well as or
better than the public schools, 406 U.S. at 222, it seems clear that exemptions will not be
lightly given. Furthermore, the impact of Amish employers on the social security system
differs both in kind and degree from Amish parents who are concerned only with their own
children and presumably have no effect on students in the public school system.
120. Pillar of Fire, 191 Colo. at 241, 552 P.2d at 25; see also Order of Friars Minor of
Province of Most Holy Name v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 186 Colo. 367, 527 P.2d
804 (1974).
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ling state interest where comprehensive zoning ordinances 21 and
historic districts122 were at issue.
It is unclear whether the state's interest would be compelling in
the case of a religious property that stands as an isolated
landmark. The Penn Central Court rejected a distinction between
isolated landmarks and historic districts when it found that New
York City's isolated landmarks were legitimate elements of a
comprehensive plan. 123 While the relationship of individual build-
ings to the success of a historic district is evident, it is much more
difficult to view isolated landmarks as part of a unified system.
Particularly in large urban areas, it is more realistic to view them
as insular idiosyncratic units with no connection to each other or
any system. Moreover, the Penn Central case did not involve first
amendment issues, so it is not clear whether the state's interest in
maintaining an amorphous "plan" could override the right to free
exercise. If the religious buildings are seen as unrelated units, the
state's interest in maintaining a system is insufficient justification
for an infringement of religious freedom. 124
A useful analogy can be drawn between the landmark situa-
tion and the social security system. Although the Lee Court found
a compelling interest in maintaining the system, it also noted that
the Internal Revenue Service provides a religious exemption from
social security taxes for self-employed individuals. 25 The reli-
gious employer who affects the system by hiring other workers
121. Euclid, 272 U.S. 365.
122. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 905 (1976).
123. 438 U.S. at 132. Contra Pyke,Architectural Controls and the Individual Landmark,
36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 398 (1971) (arguing that the comprehensiveness of a zoning
law may serve as precedent for historic district regulation, but can only partially support
regulation of isolated landmarks). The Pyke article was written before Penn Central was
decided.
124. One author notes that "public purposes may not be as significantly present" in the
case of isolated landmarks. Sackman, supra note 14, at 255.
125. 455 U.S. at 255-56, 260-61 (construing I.R.C. § 1402(g) (1982)). To qualify for
the exemption, the taxpayer must be a member of a recognized religious sect whose teach-
ings oppose acceptance of public or private insurance. Moreover, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services must determine that the religious sect is capable of providing for its
members without social security's help. The Eighth Circuit has held that Congress could
have concluded that such assistance would be forthcoming from fellow members of a reli-
gious sect, while there would be no such guarantee with respect to unaffiliated members of
the general public. Jaggard v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979). Again, the importance of maintaining the system is evident.
If individuals were exempted without some assurance that they would find assistance pri-
vately, they could become burdens on the retirement system without having contributed to
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may be analogized to the landmark that is part of a historic dis-
trict, while the self-employed individual with minimal effect on
the overall scheme may be likened to the isolated landmark. The
state has a much stronger interest in controlling the employer and
the historic district simply because the success of the comprehen-
sive plan depends more upon their inclusion.
One state supreme court has made some rather sweeping asser-
tions regarding the "pre-eminent status of religious institutions"' 26
in the context of property restrictions. Ultimately, however, the
determination will depend on the particular circumstances of the
religious organization. That Churches.A, B, C, and D are isolated
landmarks should weigh significantly in their favor. None is cru-
cial to sustaining the character of a historic area; rather, each is an
individual tribute to some historic event or architectural style.
This is not to suggest that A, B, and D would not be missed if they
were demolished, or that C's alteration would not be lamented. It
is merely to observe that the state's interest is not as pronounced
as it might be in the case of a historic district component.
Churches A and C would remain standing if their permits
were granted. InA's case, demolition is requested for an adjacent
building. The court would have to consider whether the church
and its adjacent building together represent greater historic or ar-
chitectural "value" as a complete entity than would the church
alone. Balanced against this possibility is the human services ele-
ment, 127 the severity of the financial burden, 128 and the fact that
the city will retain its landmark church. Since ChurchA itself will
remain untouched, and since it needs the proposed new building
to keep its congregation functioning, support its ministry to the
poor, and shelter its human service activities, the scales seem to tip
in Church A's favor.
Like Church A, Church C proposes no alterations to the
126. Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38
N.Y.2d 283, 288, 342 N.E.2d 534, 538, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747, 753, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950
(1975). Although the court's language in Roslyn Harbor is encouraging to religious practi-
tioners seeking to challenge zoning laws, the court did nothing more than engage in ad hoc
balancing. Faced with an ordinance that allowed setback variances for individual resi-
dences yet prohibited such variances for religious properties, the court held the ordinance
unconstitutional on the particular facts before it. See also Westchester Reform Temple v.
Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 497, 239 N.E.2d 891, 896, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 304 (1968). But see
Free Exercise, supra note 83, at 1254 (arguing that Rosln Harbor grants religious institu-
tions more freedom from government regulation than the Supreme Court has ever
warranted).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
128. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
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church building itself. Modifications would be confined to the par-
ish house, enabling the church to continue its ministry to the poor.
Under such circumstances, the state would best protect its interests
by agreeing to a parish house addition that harmonizes in style
and size with the existing structure.129 If this is possible, the alter-
ation should be allowed, since the church's proposal would pose
no substantial threat to the state.
Of the four scenarios, Church B has the weakest case. While
the financial burden may become severe, it also appears that the
church has alternatives yet to be explored. 131 Until those alterna-
tives are pursued, the church's proposed demolition seems merely
a measure of convenience insufficient to outweigh the state's inter-
est in preservation, particularly in light of the modest burden on
the congregation's right to free exercise.
In Church D's case, however, there are compelling reasons for
allowing demolition. It can be argued that the state itself has an
interest in permitting it, since the building may soon threaten the
health and safety of the congregants.131 Even absent that factor,
the burden on the congregation's right to free exercise would
probably outweigh the state's interest in aesthetics and historic
preservation.
When a congregation seeks alteration or demolition of a
landmark church or adjacent building and permission is denied
by the local landmarks commission, the state must show an inter-
est of sufficient magnitude to outweigh any substantial infringe-
ment of the congregation's free exercise right. Furthermore, the
state must show that there is no less restrictive means to accom-
plish its goals or protect its interests.132
D. Less Restrictive Alternatives for Churches A, B, C, and D
In the context of landmark law, the establishment clause of the
first amendment may preclude special provisions for properties
owned by religious organizations. To avoid the constitutional
prohibition against establishment of religion, government regula-
tion or action must have both a secular purpose 133 and a "direct
129. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137. Such accommodations are likely to persuade the
landmarks commission to grant an alteration permit. Id.
130. See supra text following note 87.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
132. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
133. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (requirement that
[Vol. 34:144
RELIGIOUS LAINDMARKS
and immediate" secular effect, 134 neither of which advances or in-
hibits religion. 135 It must also avoid "excessive governmental en-
tanglement, ' 136  either administrative1 37  or political, 138  with
religion.
A landmark law which specifically exempts religious organiza-
tions from some or all of its provisions, or provides for them in a
unique way, would be problematic. By analogy to the tax exemp-
tions afforded religious organizations, it is arguable that exemp-
tions from the landmark laws should also be allowed. The
problem with this analogy is that the Supreme Court has stressed
the enduring governmental acceptance of the tax exemption in
United States history.1 39  There is no historical exemption in
landmark law.
By requiring the owner's consent before a property can be
given landmark status, the state's goals may be pursued in a less
burdensome manner. There would be no establishment clause
problems with such a requirement because it would apply to every
property owner facing landmark designation. Although such a
provision might appear to thwart the state's purposes, many land-
owners might find landmarking advantegeous and consent to the
designation. For some, the prestige and tourist revenues that ac-
company landmark status would be sufficient to entice acquies-
cence." 4 Others would be attracted by the tax advantages to
owners of landmarked properties. 4'
The federal government, which expresses a strong interest in
portions of Bible be read at beginning of each school day struck down as violation of the
establishment clause).
134. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (tuition reimburse-
ment and income tax relief to parents of private school students held unconstitutional).
135. Id.
136. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (property tax exemptions to own-
ers of property used for religious purposes upheld). The Walz Court noted that some ac-
commodation of religious interests is permissible so long as it does not involve the
government in either supporting or administrating religion. Id. at 668-69.
137. Id. at 675.
138. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971) (reimbursement to parochial
schools for teachers providing secular education unconstitutional). The Court observed
that such a reimbursement program would require too much state supervision to insure
that those whose salaries were at issue were not actually teaching religious subjects. Id. at
619.
139. Id. at 624; Walk, 397 U.S. at 676-78.
140. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 109 (quoting Naw YORK CrrY, N.Y., CHARTER &
CODE ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0(b) (1976)); see also Pyke, supra note 123, at 399.
141. See Wilson & Winkler, supra note 27, at 339. Thus, a city's historic and cultural
resources would not be severely depleted by a consent provision.
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historic preservation, 142 has recently amended the federal statute
to require an owner's consent. 143 New York City, whose
landmark provisions are amongst the nation's most restrictive,'"
is currently considering such an amendment. 145 There is, thus,
some indication already that legislatures feel the state's interest
would be sufficiently guarded if this route were taken.
If a congregation consents to a landmark designation, it can
hardly object when the local commission refuses to allow demoli-
tion. Problems may occur where a church initially agrees to be
landmarked, but later finds itself burdened as a result of changes
over time. As the building grows older and begins to deteriorate,
as in the case of Church D, or as the needs of the congregation
increase (Church A and C) or change (Church B), the
landmarked church may find an infringement on its ability to
practice its religion that did not exist at the time of the original
designation. To anticipate such situations, the law might provide
for review of the designation either at the request of the owner or
on a periodic basis.
Alternatively, landmark laws might provide for contractual ar-
rangements between the government and certain property owners.
Although government may not contract away the right to exercise
its police power, 146 it may contract with private individuals in ar-
eas beyond the police power's reach. Where first amendment pro-
tection removes specific religious buildings from the embrace of
the police power, a landmark commission that contracts with a
religious organization would merely be bargaining for an asset to
which it otherwise would not have been entitled. Landmark ordi-
nances would continue to operate as they do now on most
landmarked properties. For those structures outside the reach of
the police power, however, the property owner would only assume
affirmative preservation obligations by contract. Presumably
142. See National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 470-1 (1982)
(declaration of policy).
143. Id. § 470a(a)(6). While the National Register is merely a planning tool and not a
regulatory control, to the extent that municipalities use it as a basis for restricting proper-
ties, such an amendment may result in changes locally. See supra note 26 and accompany-
ing text.
144. NEw YORK CITy, N.Y., CHARTER & CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976
& Supp. 1983-84).
145. 10341 N.Y.S., 13043 N.Y.A., 205th Leg. Reg. Sess., 1982 (proposed amendment to
N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977)).
146. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comn'n, 17
Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976); Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22,
174 N.W.2d 533 (1970).
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there would be few such structures, so the state's interest in his-
toric and architectural preservation would not be threatened.
That less burdensome alternatives exist should weigh heavily in
the churches' favor.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the state's interest in historic and architectural preserva-
tion conflicts with a congregation's right to the free exercise of
religion, courts must use a balancing test to determine whether the
burden on the first amendment right will be tolerated. This in-
volves a weighing of the nature and degree of the burden against
the nature and strength of the state's concern, and an inquiry into
whether the state might protect its interest through less restrictive
means. The resolution will depend on the facts peculiar to each
case.
In the context of historic preservation of isolated properties,
the burden on free exercise will be heaviest and the state's interest
weakest when worship itself or the actual church building is af-
fected by the landmark designation, or when demolition is the
only feasible solution to severe financial distress, lack of alterna-
tive sites, or structural inadequacy. The scales tip in the state's
favor to some degree when religious activities other than worship
are affected. If, however, these practices are central to a denomi-
nation's beliefs or supplement the state's own programs, the situa-
tion may still warrant first amendment protection.
Because of potential establishment clause problems in exempt-
ing churches from the general operation of landmark laws, the
best solution lies either in a consent requirement or contractual
arrangements. By virtue of these less burdensome methods of
protecting state interests, infringement of a congregation's right to
the free exercise of religion, caused by its church's landmark sta-
tus, must not be tolerated.
EVELYN B. NEWELL
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APPENDIX
Summary of Hypothetical Fact Patterns
Church A
1. Isolated landmark;
2. Predicts bankruptcy by century's end;
3. Proposes to raze adjacent landmark building;
4. Proposes to replace adjacent building with multi-story office
tower:
a. Revenues would ensure financial stability;
b. Revenues would support ministry to the poor;
c. New building would include space for human service
activities;
5. Physical plant not spatially a problem:
a. Would be less expensive to maintain if renovated; but
b. Congregation has not yet outgrown it;
6. Application for permit to demolish adjacent building has been
denied.
Church B
1. Isolated landmark;
2. When originally built in rural setting, congregation lived
nearby;
3. Today church in center of urban area;
4. Most members have moved to suburbs-closest is one-half
hour away;
5. Proposes sale of church building and reconstruction closer to
members;
6. Attempts to find buyer have failed;
7. Dwindling congregation and resulting reduction in revenues
have burdened budget;
8. Application for permission to demolish to make property
more attractive to commercial developers has been denied.
Church C
1. Isolated landmark;
2. House of worship itself not at issue;
3. Adjacent landmarked parish house woefully inadequate.
4. Parish house contains church offices, day care center, soup
kitchen, and classrooms for religious instruction;
5. Proposes addition to parish house to meet needs of rapidly
expanding congregation;
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6. Three sets of plans for proposed addition have been rejected.
Church D
1. Isolated landmark;
2. Obscure denomination of major world religion;
3. Only a dozen other such congregations in the U.S.-none
within 500 miles of Church D;
4. Congregation has increased to point where house of worship
is completely inadequate;
5. Church building experiencing structural decay;
6. Cost of alteration or addition prohibitive;
7. Application for demolition permit has been denied.

